Executive Summary
Over the past two decades, China has transitioned from a marginal trading partner to the second-most important partner for Central America, second only to the United States. However, this has resulted from a relationship marked by a profound trade asymmetry: while imports from China have grown rapidly and diversified over time, Central American exports to the country have expanded at a much slower pace, concentrated in a few low-value-added goods, with the partial exception of Costa Rica.
Despite diplomatic outreach between several countries in the region and Beijing, including the establishment of diplomatic relations by Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras, growth expectations have not materialized. On the contrary, the trade deficit has expanded substantially.
In 2024, exports to China accounted for 1.31% of the region’s total exports, while imports from China accounted for 17.04% of the region’s total imports. These results position China as a net supplier rather than as an export destination, contrary to what various Central American administrations had hoped and promised, and despite promoting free trade agreements whose results seem to exacerbate the prevailing trend of past decades.
With the exception of Costa Rica, whose exports include high-tech goods such as microchips and medical devices, the rest of the region primarily exports agricultural products, minerals, and other low-value-added goods. These products are typically vulnerable to price volatility in international markets, show limited sophistication, and are exported in small volumes. Additional structural challenges the region faces include a lack of competitiveness, limited knowledge of the Chinese market and its customs and bureaucracy, for example.
This report also analyzes relevant aspects of this trade relationship, including the lack of expertise among Central American administrations in trade negotiations and the impact on key industrial sectors in the region. It also addresses cases such as the growing and opaque penetration of Chinese capital in extractive sectors, like mining in Panama and Nicaragua, as well as Beijing’s trade coercion against Guatemala due to its diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
In light of this scenario, the report concludes that the region needs to pursue a comprehensive trade strategy toward China, one that includes the protection of strategic sectors, promotion of value-added production, diversification of export and import markets, and adequate consideration of its development requirements.


